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Abstract
In this Article we provide a close analysis of the Chinese
Dietary Guidelines – the Food Pagoda. Our focus on the dietary
guidelines is motivated by two main considerations. First, the
guidelines represent the most comprehensive, nationwide, statesponsored effort to educate the people of China about food. Like
citizens in most countries, Chinese people are presented with
numerous, often competing, messages from scientists, food gurus
and online influencers. The dietary guidelines are different in that
they are backed by an entire suite of governmental resources for
nationwide dissemination through hospitals, schools, public
billboards, TV and radio ads, among others. Among all the food
advices and recommendations in China, it is the official dietary
guidelines that have the greatest potential for changing dietary
preferences. Second, understanding the Chinese dietary guidelines
provides a useful basis for international comparison, since more than
100 countries around the world have dietary guidelines. Whether in
the form of a pyramid or a plate, visualizations of the “ideal” national
diet have become a common vector for official food advice.
Examining the dietary guidelines therefore helps situate China in the
broader context of government-proffered food advice. In this
Article, we examine the historical evolution of China’s Dietary
Guidelines and their implications for environment, health, and
animal welfare. Comparing the guidelines to longitudinal survey
data about actual consumption provides a unique window on these
issues, and in this Article we discuss what this glimpse may suggest
for climate, health, and animal welfare going forward.
I. Introduction
At the height of COVID-19’s initial outbreak in China,
alongside lockdowns, contact tracing, and medical resource
mobilization, an integral part of China’s national pandemic response
*
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strategy was the Dietary Guidelines for the Prevention and Treatment
of COVID-19. 1 Consistent with health practices since Chinese
antiquity,2 the Guidelines stress the importance of a balanced diet in
fending off diseases.3 The ancient Chinese adage that “food is the
absolute to the people,” or “min yi shi wei tian,” still rings true.
Despite the centrality of food in Chinese culture and the
weight of the nation’s food economy, it is glaringly absent when it
comes to broader conversations about China’s environmental
protection and responses to climate change. China’s national food
policies have largely been driven by nutritional and health
considerations, to the neglect of the myriad connections of the food
economy to wider issues of climate resilience, ecological
sustainability, and animal welfare.
China is not alone in this respect. In April, 2021, in response
to a claim circulating in right-wing media outlets, the U.S. Secretary
of Agriculture declared that “there is no effort designed to limit
people’s intake of beef coming out of President Biden’s White House
or USDA.” 4 The sheer political power of animal agriculture is
enough to ensure that in most countries, taking beef off the table, is
not on the table for discussion.5
It was thus both surprising and striking when a widely
circulated news story in The Guardian praised China for displaying
“massive leadership” in planning to “cut meat consumption in half,”

1

See Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Fangzhi Yingyang Shanshi
Zhidao (新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎防治营养膳食指导) [Nutritional Dietary
Guidance for the Prevention and Treatment of Pneumonia Caused by New
Coronavirus Infection], GUOJIA WEISHENG JIANKANG WEIYUANHUI (国家卫生健康
委员会) [NATIONAL HEALTH COMMISSION] (Feb. 8, 2020),
http://www.nhc.gov.cn/sps/s7886/202002/a69fd36d54514c5a9a3f456188cbc428.s
html.
2See RUTH ROGASKI, HYGIENIC MODERNITY: MEANINGS OF HEALTH AND DISEASE IN
TREATY-PORT CHINA 23-25 (2014).
3 Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Fangzhi Yingyang Shanshi
Zhidao (新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎防治营养膳食指导) [Nutritional Dietary
Guidance for the Prevention and Treatment of Pneumonia Caused by New
Coronavirus Infection], supra note 1.
4 Ryan McCrimmon, Biden Isn’t Banning Meat, USDA Chief Says, POLITICO (Apr.
26, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/04/26/biden-not-banning-meatusda-484609.
5 See Oliver Lazarus et al., The Climate Responsibilities of Industrial Meat and
Dairy Producers, 165 CLIMATIC CHANGE 1, 2, 10, 15, 17-18 (2021),
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10584-021-03047-7.pdf.
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a policy move that was said to be “cheered by climate campaigners.”6
The main reference of the Guardian story was the 2016 update to
China’s national dietary guidelines, also known as the “Food
Pagoda,” which recommended daily consumption of forty to
seventy-five grams of meat for the average Chinese adult. 7 The
prospect of China’s diet going green brings excitement and hope to
a country that is troubled by environmental crises from
“airpocalypse” to “aporcalypse,” and to a world that is deep in
planetary climate catastrophe.
There are many reasons for environmental and animal
welfare groups to be concerned about China’s food trajectory.
Globally, food system-related greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions – at
18 Gt CO2 equivalent in 2015 – amount to more than a third of the
world’s total emissions.8 The most substantial share of food-related
GHG is generated by animal-sourced food production.9 According to
OECD data, China accounted for 26.3 percent of the world’s total
meat consumption in 2018, up from 14.6 percent in 1990.10 In per
capita terms, the average Chinese person consumed 49.3 kilograms
of meat in 2018, more than tripling the 1990 figure of 15.6
kilograms. 11 In 2018, the per capita consumption level in China
exceeded the global average of 34.8 kilograms by 41.7 percent,
quickly approaching the OECD average of 69.5 kilograms. 12 In
2016 alone, China slaughtered more than 14 billion terrestrial
animals for food, or about 448 animals per second.13
The rapid transformation of China’s food economy is a clear
testament to the success with which the most populous country on
the planet has managed to alleviate poverty, but it is also a source of
Oliver Milman & Stuart Leavenworth, China’s Plan to Cut Meat Consumption by
50% Cheered by Climate Campaigners, THE GUARDIAN (June 20, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/20/chinas-meat-consumptionclimate-change.
7 Yiban Renqun Shanshi Zhinan (一般人群膳食指南) [Dietary Guidelines for the
6

General Population], ZHONGGUO YINGYANG XUEHUI (中国营养学会) [CHINESE
NUTRITION SOCIETY], http://dg.cnsoc.org/article/2016b.html (last visited Oct. 20,
2021).
8 M. Crippa, et al., Food Systems Are Responsible for a Third of Global
Anthropogenic GHG Emissions, 2 NATURE FOOD, 198, 198–209 (2021).
9 Matthew N. Hayek et al., The Carbon Opportunity Cost of Animal-Sourced Food
Production on Land, 4 NATURE SUSTAINABILITY 21, 21 (2021).
10 Meat Consumption, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV,
https://data.oecd.org/agroutput/meat-consumption.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Animal Slaughter and Meat Production – China, TERRASTENDO (Jan. 26, 2018),
https://terrastendo.net/infographics/animal-slaughter-and-meat-production-china/
(last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
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growing concern for Chinese policymakers. With obesity – and
especially child obesity – on the rise, and a host of diet-related
diseases becoming more prevalent than ever, the public health
implications of high-energy and protein-rich food consumption are
becoming harder to overlook.14 At the same time, rapid urbanization
puts unprecedented strains on rural agricultural productivity in a
country where per capita arable land is a less than half of the global
average, thus posing a serious challenge to self-sufficiency. 15
Improving access to food has morphed from an overwhelming social,
political, and economic success, to a salient health, and even security
risk for China.
It is in this context that the environmental implications of the
Chinese food economy have gained renewed importance. From
phosphorus, nitrogen, and GHG emissions to water and land uses,
China’s diet has an outsized impact on all aspects of global
sustainability, health, and wellbeing. 16 The need to address the
climate-agriculture nexus is further accentuated by the Chinese
leadership’s ambitious goal to peak carbon emissions before 2030
and to reach carbon neutrality by 2060. 17 A greener diet has the
potential to help achieve environmental goals, and also contribute to
population health, enhance food security, and improve animal
welfare.18 Greening China’s diet is therefore a truly monumental
task for China and the world.
In this spirit, we provide a close analysis of the Chinese
Dietary Guidelines – the Food Pagoda. Our focus on the dietary
guidelines is motivated by two main considerations. First, the
guidelines represent the most comprehensive, nationwide, state14

See H. Charles Godfray et al., Meat Consumption, Health, and the Environment,
361 SCIENCE 1, 2-3 (2018),
http://yacoby.physics.harvard.edu/Publications/eaam5324.full.pdf. See also Y. Li
et al., Determinants of Childhood Overweight and Obesity in China, 97 BRIT. J.
NUTRITION 210, 211-12 (2007); Jiguo Zhang et al., Dietary Patterns and Their
Associations with Childhood Obesity in China, 113 BRIT. J. NUTRITION 1978, 1978
(2015).
15 Chunyang He et al., Urban Expansion Brought Stress to Food Security in China:
Evidence from Decreased Cropland Net Primary Productivity, 576 SCI. TOTAL
ENV’T 660, 661 (2016).
16 See Yuanchao Hu et al., Food Production in China Requires Intensified
Measures to Be Consistent with National and Provincial Environmental
Boundaries, 1 NATURE FOOD 572, 572 (2020).
17 Steven Lee Myers, China’s Pledge to Be Carbon Neutral by 2060: What It
Means, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/23/world/asia/china-climate-change.html.
18 See ACAD. OF GLOB. FOOD ECONS. & POL’Y, CHINA AGRIC. UNIV. [AGFEP] ET
AL., 2021 CHINA AND GLOBAL FOOD POLICY REPORT: RETHINKING AGRIFOOD
SYSTEMS FOR THE POST-COVID WORLD 41-42 (2021).
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sponsored effort to educate the people of China about food. Like
citizens in most countries, Chinese people are presented with
numerous, often competing, messages from scientists, food gurus
and online influencers. The dietary guidelines are different in that
they are backed by an entire suite of governmental resources for
nationwide dissemination through hospitals, schools, public
billboards, TV and radio ads, among others. Among all the food
advices and recommendations in China, it is the official dietary
guidelines that in China have the greatest potential for changing
dietary preferences. Second, understanding the Chinese dietary
guidelines provides a useful basis for international comparison, since
more than 100 countries around the world have dietary guidelines.19
Whether in the form of a pyramid or a plate, visualizations of the
“ideal” national diet have become a common vector for official food
advice. 20 Examining the dietary guidelines therefore helps situate
China in the broader context of government-proffered food advice.
In this Article, we examine the historical evolution of China’s
Dietary Guidelines and their implications for environment, health,
and animal welfare. Comparing the guidelines to longitudinal
survey data about actual consumption provides a unique window on
these issues, and in this Article we discuss what this glimpse may
suggest for climate, health, and animal welfare going forward.
We want to emphasize at the outset the tentative nature of
our conclusions. In principle, a more sophisticated modeling
approach could provide stronger evidence for our claims, but the
sporadic and potentially unreliable nature of the data, and the way
that it is aggregated, make it difficult to implement such an approach
with any confidence. In any case, we believe that the methods that
we employ in this paper provide new insights and suggest productive
lines of further research.21
II. China’s Dietary Guidelines
From the early nineteenth century until the end of the Great
Leap Forward in 1961, famines were an every-generational

19

FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS [FAO], FOOD-BASED DIETARY
GUIDELINES, http://www.fao.org/nutrition/nutrition-education/food-dietaryguidelines/en/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
20 Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Fangzhi Yingyang Shanshi
Zhidao (新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎防治营养膳食指导) [Nutritional Dietary
Guidance for the Prevention and Treatment of Pneumonia Caused by New
Coronavirus Infection], supra note 1.
21 Similar points about methodology are made by Hu. See Hu, infra note 83.
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occurrence in China.22 When the People’s Republic of China was
declared in 1949, life expectancy at birth was 35 years.23 It increased
gradually over the next decade, but not dramatically until after the
Great Leap Forward. 24 Since then, there has been an astounding
improvement in food accessibility with dramatic results. For
example, 9-year old boys in China in 2019 were 8 cm taller than in
1985, the largest increase of any country in the world over that period
of time. 25
China’s first national dietary guidelines were produced in
1989 when the memory of famine was still fresh and about 200
million people remained undernourished.26 The guidelines took the
form of eight qualitative recommendations: (1) Eat a variety of
foods; (2) Do not be hungry, and do not eat until too full; (3) Eat
moderate amounts of oils and fats; (4) Balance coarse and refined
grains; (5) Use a limited amount of salt; (6) Eat fewer sweets; (7)
Moderate alcoholic drinks; and (8) Balance the three daily meals
(Standing Board of Chinese Nutrition Society 1990).27 In its original
publication, each entry was followed by a paragraph of brief
explanation. 28 A set of eight posters were designed and widely
distributed, each corresponding to one of the recommendations.29
In 1997, the guidelines were revised by a broad group of
nutritionists, and for the first time took the visual form of the pagoda
and provided specific quantitative recommendations for daily food
consumption (Figure 1).30
22

See S.F. Du et al., China in the Period of Transition from Scarcity and Extensive
Undernutrition to Emerging Nutrition-Related Non-Communicable Diseases,
1949–1992, 15 OBESITY REVS. 8, 8(2013).
23 Id at 13-14.
24 Id.
25 Andrea Rodriguez-Martinez et al., Height and Body-Mass Index Trajectories of
School-Aged Children and Adolescents from 1985 to 2019 in 200 Countries and
Territories: A Pooled Analysis of 2181 Population-Based Studies with 65 Million
Participants, 396 LANCET 1511, 1515 (2020).
26 FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS [FAO], THE STATE OF FOOD
INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2006: ERADICATING WORLD HUNGER (2006).
27 Zhongguo Jumin Shanshi Zhinan” 1989 Nian Banben (《中国居民膳食指南》
1989 年版本) [“Dietary Guidelines for Chinese Residents” 1989 Edition],
ZHONGGUO YINGYANG XUEHUI (中国营养学会) [CHINESE NUTRITION SOCIETY],
http://dg.cnsoc.org/article/1989b.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
28 Keyou Ge, The Transition of Chinese Dietary Guidelines and the Food Guide
Pagoda, 20 ASIA PAC. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 439, 439-40 (2011),
https://www.airitilibrary.com/Publication/alDetailedMesh?DocID=09647058201109-201306100025-201306100025-439-446.
29 Id.
30 “Zhongguo Jumin Shanshi Zhinan” 1997 Nian Banben (《中国居民膳食指南
》1997 年版本) ["Dietary Guidelines for Chinese Residents” 1997 Edition],
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Figure 1. The Food Pagoda (1997)
In 2007, the guidelines were revised by the Chinese
Nutrition Society and endorsed by the Chinese Ministry of Health
(Figure 2).31

ZHONGGUO YINGYANG XUEHUI (中国营养学会) [CHINESE NUTRITION SOCIETY],
http://dg.cnsoc.org/article/1997b.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
31 “Zhongguo Jumin Shanshi Zhinan” 2007 Nian Banben (《中国居民膳食指南
》2007 年版本) ["Chinese Resident Dietary Guidelines” 2007 Edition],
ZHONGGUO YINGYANG XUEHUI (中国营养学会) [CHINESE NUTRITION SOCIETY],
http://dg.cnsoc.org/article/2007b.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
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Figure 2. The Food Pagoda (2007)
In 2016 the pagoda was revised again (Figure 3) on orders
from the National Health Commission of China (what had previously
been the Ministry of Health).32

32

Yiban Renqun Shanshi Zhinan (一般人群膳食指南) [Dietary Guidelines for the
General Population], supra note 7.
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Figure 3. The Food Pagoda (2016)
The primary function of the guidelines is public education.
Through information campaigns, propaganda posters, dedicated
media programming, school curricula, and other means, health
authorities all over China regularly sponsor events that prominently
feature the food pagoda.33 The express purposes of these events are
to call attention to the most pressing diet-related health concerns of
the nation and to encourage citizens to follow the latest consensus
among Chinese nutritionists. 34 Since the guidelines’ most recent
update in 2016, provincial and local governments across the country
have rallied up comprehensive support mechanisms to raise public
awareness of the guidelines, in compliance with top-level mandates

33

Ge, supra note 28, at 439-40.
See YueXin Yang et al., New Chinese Dietary Guidelines: Healthy Eating
Patterns and Food-Based Dietary Recommendations, ASIA PAC. J. CLINICAL
NUTRITION 908, 908-13 (2018),
https://apjcn.nhri.org.tw/server/APJCN/27/4/908.pdf.
34
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from Beijing.35 For example, the hallways of hospitals are decorated
with propaganda posters that feature the food pagoda, reminding
pregnant women to have plenty of dairy and meat.36 These efforts
have paid off. Survey data show that incrementally larger shares of
the Chinese population – from 7.5 percent in 2004 to 21.1 in 2015 –
have been made aware of the guidelines.37
Each iteration of the guidelines has been issued in a country
that has undergone serious change since the previous guidelines. In
1989 per capita income was $311 per year and three-quarters of the
population was rural. 38 In 2016 per capita income was more than
$8,000 per year and only 43% of the population was rural.39 Today,
with 11% of the population malnourished and 25% overweight,
China’s nutritional profile resembles that of a western nation.40 The
authors of the guidelines emphasize that, in addition to being based
on the evolving science of nutrition, they are responsive to changing
Chinese dietary habits.41 According to China’s top nutritionist Keyou

35

See Xiaoyuan Xing et al., Analysis on the Publicity and Education Effect of
Urban Community Middle-Aged and Elderly People Nutrition and Dietary, 101
ADVANCES SOC. SCI., EDUC. & HUMS. RSCH. 467, 467-472 (2017),
https://www.atlantis-press.com/article/25874418.pdf.
36 See id. at 470.
37 Xiaofang Jia (贾小芳) et al., 2004—2015 Nian Zhongguo Chengnian Jumin
Shanshi Yingyang Zhishi Zhixiao Lu de Bianhua Qushi (2004—2015 年中国成年

居民膳食营养知识知晓率的变化趋势) [Changes in the Awareness Rate of
Dietary Nutrition Knowledge Among Chinese Adult Residents from 2004-2015],
49 WEI SHENG YAN JIU (卫生研究) [J. HYGIENE RSCH.] 345, 345–56 (2020).
38 GDP Per Capita (Current US$) —China, THE WORLD BANK (2021),
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CN (last
visited Oct. 16, 2021); Rural Population (% of Total Population) —China, THE
WORLD BANK (2021),
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?locations=CN (last visited
Oct. 16, 2021).
39 GDP Per Capita (Current US$) —China, supra note 38; RURAL POPULATION (%
OF TOTAL POPULATION) Rural Population (% of Total Population) —China, supra
note 38.
40 See China, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, https://www.wfp.org/countries/china
(last visited Oct. 20, 2021). By way of comparison, more than 10% of US
households are considered food insecure while more than 70% of Americans are
overweight or obese. See Security Status of U.S. Households in 2020, U.S. DEP’T
OF AGRIC., ECON. RSCH. SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutritionassistance/food-security-in-the-us/key-statistics-graphics.aspx (Sept. 8, 2021);
Overweight & Obesity Statistics, NAT’L INST. OF DIABETES & DIGESTIVE & KIDNEY
DISEASES, https://www.niddk.nih.gov/health-information/healthstatistics/overweight-obesity (Aug. 2017).
41 See Zhongguo Jumin Shanshi Zhinan de Fa Zhan Zhuangkuang (中国居民膳食

指南的发展状况) [The Development Status of Chinese Residents’ Dietary
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Ge, each iteration of the food pagoda was formulated after extensive
deliberation among the nation’s nutritionists on the basis of empirical
evidence from the once-every-decade national nutrition surveys.42 In
1959, the Chinese government conducted a nutritional survey, and
since 1982 it has conducted a nutritional survey every ten years.43 By
closely examining the relationship between the recommendations
and the survey data, we can reconstruct some underlying patterns in
China’s food policies.44
III. The Humble Pagoda
When comparing the recommendations to actual behavior,
the most striking feature is the gap between the two.

2016/pagoda
2012/actuals
2007/pagoda
2002/actuals
1997/pagoda
1992/actuals
1982/actuals
0

500

1000

1500

vegetables

staples

dairy

fruits

meats

aquatic food

eggs

legume

oil

2000

Figure 4. China's Diet, Surveyed Trends (1982, 1992, 2002, 2012)
and Pagoda Goals (1997, 2007, 2016) (grams/day)45
Guidelines], ZHONGGUO YINGYANG XUEHUI (中国营养学会) [CHINESE NUTRITION
SOCIETY], http://dg.cnsoc.org/article/lsqy.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
42 See Ge, supra note 28, at 439.
43 Yuna He et al., Data Resource Profile: China National Nutrition Surveys, 48
INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 368, 368-368f (2019).
44 There are no computer files for the 1959 survey so, like most scholars, we begin
our investigation with the 1982 survey.
45 See “2006 Zhongguo Weisheng Tongji Nianjian” (《2006 中国卫生统计年鉴
》) [“2006 China Health Statistics Yearbook”], GUOJIA WEISHENG JIANKANG
WEIYUANHUI (国家卫生健康委员会) [NATIONAL HEALTH COMMISSION],
http://www.nhc.gov.cn/htmlfiles/zwgkzt/ptjnj/year2006/index.html (last visited
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In every case the recommendations call for significantly
greater food consumption by weight than is actually consumed. 46
Even more striking is the fact that actual consumption has been
declining since the first survey in 1982, and the gap between actual
consumption and the recommendations has been growing.47 Food
consumption by weight does not convert easily into calories,
especially when multiple food groups are involved.48 However, all
the dietary recommendations are based on an intake of 2,400 calories
per day, and the text that accompanies them indicates that anything
between 1,600 and 2,400 calories per day is acceptable, depending
on individual health conditions. 49 Roughly speaking, the actual
Chinese diet is moving towards calorically dense food consumed in
low quantities, while the recommendations would move the diet
towards less calorically dense foods consumed in greater quantities.50
The feature of the 2016 food pagoda that caught the attention
of the world was its ambition for drastically reducing China’s meat
consumption.51

Nov. 28, 2021); China Statistical Yearbook 2019, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
STATISTICS OF CHINA, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2019/indexeh.htm (last
visited Nov. 29, 2021).
46 See “Zhongguo Jumin Shanshi Zhinan” 1989 Nian Banben (《中国居民膳食指
南》1989 年版本) [“Dietary Guidelines for Chinese Residents” 1989 Edition],
supra note 27; Zhongguo Jumin Shanshi Zhinan” 1997 Nian Banben (《中国居民
膳食指南》1997 年版本) ["Dietary Guidelines for Chinese Residents” 1997
Edition], supra note 30; “Zhongguo Jumin Shanshi Zhinan” 2007 Nian Banben (
《中国居民膳食指南》2007 年版本) ["Chinese Resident Dietary Guidelines”
2007 Edition], supra note 31; Yiban Renqun Shanshi Zhinan (一般人群膳食指南)
[Dietary Guidelines for the General Population], supra note 7.
47 Ge, supra note 28.
48 Id.
49 He et al., supra note 43.
50 Id.
51 Milman & Leavenworth, supra note 6.
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Figure 5. Meat in China's Diet, Observed Trends and Pagoda Goals
(grams/day)52
What was less noticed is that the 2007 food pagoda had
called for an even larger reduction in meat consumption from actual
consumption levels. 53 In the face of the steady growth in meat
consumption since 1982 (Figure 5), the 2016 recommendations
doubled down and recommended even further reductions.54
It appears that in its 2016 recommendations, Chinese state
nutritionists were acting against the rising tide, advocating for
omnivorous moderation even when the country of 1.4 billion was
exhibiting a growing appetite for meat.55 However, in many areas,
the pagoda recommendations reinforce, rather than challenge,
existing dietary trends. As Figure 4 shows, this is most evidently the
case for staples, 56 the observed consumption level of which has
declined steadily at the rate of at least 15 percent per decennial
interval. 57 The 2007 pagoda has followed suit in shedding its

See “2006 Zhongguo Weisheng Tongji Nianjian” (《2006 中国卫生统计年鉴
》) [“2006 China Health Statistics Yearbook”], supra note 45; China Statistical
52

Yearbook 2019, supra note 45.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Our tabulation for the category of staples includes rice, flour, cereals, tubers, and
their products, in keeping with the convention in Chinese nutrition surveys.
57 Ge, supra note 28 at 443.
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recommended level of staples. 58 A similar pattern applies to
vegetables.59 Conversely, in the case of oil, observed consumption
has gone up, and the pagoda recommendation has risen in
synchrony.60 Perhaps more salient are the cases of fruits and aquatic
food, where the growth of consumption in early decades was
followed by a moderate decline in recent periods in urban areas.61 As
if on cue, the pagoda recommendations initially went up before
slipping downward. 62 In general, the food pagoda serves to
reproduce existing trajectories, rather than contradicting them. Meat
is an exception, rather than the norm, in the food pagoda.
The food pagodas’ tendency to follow consumption is most
evident in how the pagoda changes over time. In other words, the
evolution of the food pagoda mimics the changing trajectory of food
consumption in China. Steady growth in consumption predicts a
continuous increase in the recommendation, whereas u-shaped
consumption corresponds to u-shaped recommendation changes.
Even though the absolute values of food recommendations are by no
means close to the empirical trends, the decade-to-decade changes
most certainly are.
This humble quality of the pagoda is consistent with the fact
that the Chinese authorities do not appear to endorse the
interpretation of the food pagoda as either a sign of, or vehicle for,
Chinese environmental leadership. Indeed, the Chinese media
routinely dismiss discussions about the global environmental
implications of China’s meat consumption. For example, a Time
magazine cover story entitled “How China Could Change the World
by Taking Meat Off the Menu” received a withering response in the
official propaganda tabloid, Global Times. 63 According to the
author,
“Chinese netizens slammed Western media as being
hypocritical after an article boasted the popularity of
meat substitutes in China while accusing China of
overconsumption of meat which harms the
58

Id.
See id.at 440-41.
60 See id. at 442-44.
61 Id. at 440.
62 Id. at 442-43. Yiban Renqun Shanshi Zhinan (一般人群膳食指南) [Dietary
Guidelines for the General Population], supra note 7.
63 See Lu Yuanzhi, West Should Cut Its Own Meat Consumption if It’s Serious
About the Climate, GLOB. TIMES (Jan.24, 2021),
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213792.shtml; Charlie Campbell, How
China Could Change the World by Taking Meat off the Menu, TIME (Jan. 22,
2021), https://time.com/5930095/china-plant-based-meat/.
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environment, which, Chinese readers said not only
looks like it is hinting that Chinese people are eating
more meat substitutes as they feel guilty for eating
too much meat and hurting the environment, but,
more importantly, glossed over much higher levels
of Western meat consumption.”64
Seen from the perspective of the humble pagoda, China’s “massive
leadership” is more imagined than real.

IV. The Aspirational Pagoda
In the previous section, we suggested that the food pagoda is
humbler than it might seem—that it tends to follow consumption
trends rather than guide them. Even so, as Figure 6 makes clear the
pagoda’s recommendations for fruits, aquatic foods, eggs seem
perplexingly high (most puzzling of all is dairy which will be
discussed in Section 5).

64

Xu Keyue, Western Media Double Standard in Accusing China of Meat
Overconsumption: Expert, GLOB. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2021),
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213791.shtml.
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Figure 6. Pagoda Recommendations as Percentages
Corresponding Consumption Levels in the Prior Survey65

of

However, these recommendations take on a different
meaning in the context of urban-rural disparity in China. In Figure 7
below, the horizontal axis shows the ratio of urban to rural
consumption of foods. For example, urban dairy consumption is, on
average, 5.12 times the rural figure, whereas urban staple
consumption is only 0.77 of the rural statistic. The vertical axis, on
the other hand, tracks the pagodas’ recommended change from
surveyed consumption levels. For example, the pagodas recommend
taking, on average, 9.06 times more dairy than what Chinese
residents consume in reality. The recommendation for staples, on the
other hand, is to consume 0.21 times less than the status quo. After
tabulating the correlation between these two statistics, we derive an
R2 of 0.853, suggesting that 85.3% of the variation in the pagodas’
recommended changes is explained by urban-rural differences in
China.

See “2006 Zhongguo Weisheng Tongji Nianjian” (《2006 中国卫生统计年鉴
》) [“2006 China Health Statistics Yearbook”], supra note 45; China Statistical
65

Yearbook 2019, supra note 45.
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Pagoda Recommended Changes (y)66
This strong correlation suggests that a specter is haunting the
food pagoda – the specter of the city. In other words, the food pagoda
tends to liberally recommend foods that are favored by urbanites,
while at the same time discouraging foods that rural residents
disproportionately consume. As a result, what appear as
quintessentially Chinese urban foods such as dairy, fruits, and
aquatic foods, are further valorized by the pagoda, whereas foods that
are characteristically rural, e.g. staples, are presented as undesirable
in the pagoda. As such, the food pagoda signals the people of rural
China to look up to their urban counterparts for the ideal diet and
encourages the people of urban China to continue in their current
dietary trajectory. Perhaps inadvertently, the food pagoda may leave
rural residents of China in a constant struggle to catch up with their
urban counterparts, while neglecting—if not annihilating—the
cultures and contexts of rural livelihoods, whatever the consequences
See “2006 Zhongguo Weisheng Tongji Nianjian” (《2006 中国卫生统计年鉴
》) [“2006 China Health Statistics Yearbook”], supra note 45; China Statistical
66

Yearbook 2019, supra note 45.

2021]

CHINA’S FOOD PAGODAS

147

for environment, health, and animal welfare. The health implications
are especially significant, since the diet-related problems of urban
China are precisely those due to the overconsumption of high-calorie
fruits, high-protein aquatic foods, and high-fat dairy products.67
Our findings both confirm and challenge previous work on
the subject. Past research has suggested that Chinese urbanites tend
to better adhere to food pagoda recommendations than their rural
counterparts. 68 Our results show similar correlational strength
between urban status and the food pagoda’s recommended dietary
structure. However, our analysis leads us to consider the possibility
that if there are causal relationships here of any sort, they may go
both ways. In other words, in addition to urbanites adhering to the
food pagoda more closely, the Chinese nutritionists who construct
the food pagoda (themselves urbanites) may have encoded Chinese
urban dweller preferences in the recommendations.
Yet, even when Chinese urban meat consumption is 162
percent of the rural amount, state nutritionists have prescribed
reductions.69 The fact that it is an exception to the general pattern of
the food pagodas endorsing urban dietary trends is important. The
public health implications of China’s growing appetite for meat have
become hard to ignore, especially in cities. 70
By 2007 the
epidemiological evidence had convinced China’s top nutritionists of
the need to reverse course and limit meat intake.71 Yet, as recently
as 1997, the pagoda was telling people to consume more meat – 27.3
percent more to be exact—even though much of the increase in
overweight began between 1989 and 1991 or even before.72 It is
easy for people to become confused when there are such rapid
changes in recommendations, especially when they are made against
the background of a food pagoda that overall still asks people to eat
more of nearly everything.
V. The Strange Case of Dairy
The most glaring feature of the food pagodas is their
unrealistically high recommendations for the consumption of dairy
products. The 1997 pagoda recommendation of 100 grams/day was
67

See Li et al., supra note 14, at 212-13.
Xiaoyue Xu et al., Do Older Chinese People’s Diets Meet the Chinese Food
Pagoda Guidelines? Results from the China Health and Nutrition Survey 2009, 18
PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION, 3020, 3025-26 (2015).
69 Id.
70 Zhang et al., supra note 14, at 1983.
71 Id.
72 Id. The broader context of this meat anomaly warrants further discussion that we
hope to pursue elsewhere.
68
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nearly seven times the actual consumption level of 14.9 in 1992.73
When the 2002 consumption figure went up to 26.5, Chinese
nutritionists doubled down on their dairy recommendation,
increasing the prescribed level to 300 grams/day.74 Then, even after
actual consumption declined to 24.7 in 2012, state nutritionists
remain adamant in recommending 300 grams/day, or more than 12
times the average amount consumed (Figure 4).75
The food pagoda’s fixation with dairy could seem
improbable, especially since, historically, dairy has never been an
integral part of the Chinese diet, with the exception of a small
contingent of ethnic minority populations. 76 “Barbarian” nomadic
groups such as Mongols and Tibetans are known to have depended
on certain cattle breeds for meat and milk, giving substance to the
general cultural association of dairy products with the “lack of
civilization,” as seen from the perspective of the Chinese Han ethnic
majority.77 But even for nomads, dairy consumption was commonly
reserved for the brisk winters.78 This historical experience with dairy,
or lack thereof, is closely related to the common association between
East Asia and the idea of “lactose intolerance.” Medical scientists
have been debating for decades the questions of whether “lactose
intolerance” is biologically determined or culturally constructed, and
of whether “lactose intolerance” is a misnomer to begin with. 79
“Zhongguo Jumin Shanshi Zhinan” 1997 Nian Banben (《中国居民膳食指南
》1997 年版本) ["Dietary Guidelines for Chinese Residents” 1997 Edition],
73

supra note 30.
74 “Zhongguo Jumin Shanshi Zhinan” 2007 Nian Banben (《中国居民膳食指南
》2007 年版本) ["Chinese Resident Dietary Guidelines” 2007 Edition], supra
note 31.
75 Yiban Renqun Shanshi Zhinan (一般人群膳食指南) [Dietary Guidelines for the
General Population], supra note 7.
76 Mark Elvin, The Technology of Farming in Late-Traditional China, in THE
CHINESE AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY 13-35 (R. Barker et al. eds., 1982); Jia-Chen
Fu, Confronting the Cow: Soybean Milk and the Fashioning of a Chinese Dairy
Alternative, in MORAL FOODS: THE CONSTRUCTION OF NUTRITION AND HEALTH IN
MODERN ASIA 47, 47-65 (Angela Ki Che Leung et al. eds., 2019); Susan Glosser,
Milk for Health, Milk for Profit: Shanghai’s Chinese Dairy Industry Under
Japanese Occupation, in INVENTING NANJING ROAD: COMMERCIAL CULTURE IN
SHANGHAI, 1900-1945, 207-36 (S. Cochran ed., 1999).
77 See Megan Tracy, Pasteurizing China’s Grasslands and Sealing in Terroir, 115
AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 437, 442 (2013).
78 See Elvin, supra note 76.
79 See Frederick J. Simoons, Primary Adult Lactose Intolerance and the Milking
Habit: A Problem in Biologic and Cultural Interrelations, 15 AM. J. DIGESTIVE
DISEASES 695, 695–710 (1970); Claude Fischler, Food Habits, Social Change and
the Nature/Culture Dilemma, 19 SOC. SCI. INFO. 937, 937 (1980); Widjaja Lukito
et al., From ‘Lactose Intolerance’ to ‘Lactose Nutrition,’ 24 ASIA PAC. J. CLINICAL
NUTRITION 1, 1–8 (2015).
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While the identification of lactose intolerance as a “medical
deficiency” should be avoided, an estimated 95 percent of ethnic
Han Chinese people are not genetically predisposed to digest milk.80
Dairy marketing and recommendation in China, therefore, are up
against the entire cultural and biophysical histories of the Middle
Kingdom.
However, the peculiarity of the dairy recommendation
begins to make sense, when it is situated in the context of China’s
experience with European modernity. The en masse arrival of
European settlers and missionaries in the late 1800s and early 1900s
gave dairy an unprecedented boost in China. 81 They brought with
them, among other things, an entire suite of dairy technologies,
regulations, and cultural values. As early as 1911, Chinese Customs
official were predicting “enormous sale” of imported condensed milk
to customers in China.82 Dairy consumables took on fresh political
and even ideological meanings in China, especially as their arrival
coincided with the nation’s search for its place in the colonial world
order. 83 Frustrated by military defeats, territorial concessions, and
declining cultural prominence, Chinese intellectuals debated
heatedly about the underlying reasons for apparent Western
superiority.84 Shepherded by the commercial interests of the traders
and compradors, who wielded enormous political influence, the
intellectual crisis morphed into a wholesale obsession with Western
science, commodities, health, and nutrition.85 In this context, the line
was blurred between national strength and personal health. A foreign,
but nevertheless enviable, symbol of the Western diet, milk came to
be seen as an essential ingredient in China’s belated entry into
modernity. 86 This led to the creation of a small Chinese dairy
80

Nissim Silanikove et al., The Interrelationships Between Lactose Intolerance
and the Modern Dairy Industry: Global Perspectives in Evolutional and Historical
Backgrounds, 7 NUTRIENTS 7312, 73161 (2015).
81 See Thomas David DuBois, Branding and Retail Strategy in the Condensed Milk
Trade: Borden and Nestlé in East Asia, 1870-1929, BUSINESS HISTORY (2019),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00076791.2019.1688302.
82 See Thomas David DuBois, China’s Dairy Century: Making, Drinking and
Dreaming of Milk, in ANIMALS AND HUMAN SOCIETY IN ASIA: HISTORICAL,
CULTURAL AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES, 179, 179–211 (Rotem. Kowner et al. eds.,
2019).
83 See LO SHUK YING (盧淑櫻), Muru Yu Niunai: Jindai Zhongguo Muqin Jusese
de Chong Su, 1895-1937 (母乳與牛奶: 近代中國母親角色的重塑, 1895-1937)
[MOTHER’S MILK AND COW’S MILK: REINVENTION OF MOTHERHOOD IN MODERN
CHINA, 1895-1937] (2018).
84 See ROGASKI, supra note 4
85 See Fu, supra note 76, at 47.
86 See Xiaoqian Hu, “A Glass of Milk Strengthens a Nation.” Law Development,
and China’s Dairy Tale, 16 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 78, 78 (2020).
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industry, centered in the coastal cities and, more importantly, in the
Northeast, an area greatly influenced by Russian refugees, first from
the Great War, and then from the Bolshevik Revolution, who in some
cases brought entire dairy herds with them.87 Since then, China has
continued to integrate dairy into its diet, gradually internalizing a
form of “animal colonialism”88 into the culinary map of the nation.
The political turmoil of the twentieth century
notwithstanding, there was remarkable continuity in the promotion
of dairy in China. In Republican and Communist periods alike,
despite radically shifting winds in almost all other aspects of social
life, dairy production and consumption were consistently celebrated
as evidence of progress and prosperity. 89 Even under Japanese
occupation in the 1930s and 40s, Chinese dairy entrepreneurs
managed to enlist the support of authorities in expanding their
businesses, owing to the successful framing of milk-drinking “as the
key to China’s success in the evolutionary struggle to survive.” 90
The immediate post World War II period brought a flood of cheap
milk powder from the United States, and dairy modernization was
part of the first Five Year Plan after the birth of the “new China” in
1949.91 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the status of dairy remained
high, though supply was limited.92 Milk was classified as a “special
commodity” and allocated primarily to soldiers, cadres, and to the
young and old in urban areas.93
As the Chinese economy began to liberalize in the 1980s, the
dairy industry received yet another boost with its association with
western modernity, which has continued unabated. 94 A sign of
milk’s current status can be seen in this advertisement from early
2020 which appeared on Shanghai television, featuring Princess
Anne's son, Peter Phillips, advertising milk from Jersey cows.95

See The Dairy Market in China Will Be the World’s Largest by 2022, DAXUE
CONSULTING (June 1, 2020), https://daxueconsulting.com/china-dairy-market/.
88 See Mathilde Cohen, Animal Colonialism: The Case of Milk, 111 AM. J. INT’L
L. UNBOUND 267, 267–71 (2017).
89 See Silankiove et al., supra note 80, at 7313-15.
90 Glosser, supra note 76, at 209.
91 See A Look Through Time: Transformation of China’s Dairy Sector, DAIRY
GLOB. (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.dairyglobal.net/Markettrends/Articles/2021/4/A-look-through-time-Transformation-of-Chinas-dairysector-739294E/.
92 See id.
93 See id.
94 See id.
95 Rebecca Taylor, Queen’s Grandson Peter Phillips Flogs Royal Connections in
Chinese Milk Ad, SKY NEWS (Jan. 21, 2020), https://news.sky.com/story/queensgrandson-peter-phillips-flogs-royal-connections-in-chinese-milk-ad-11913938.
87
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Figure 8. Chinese milk advertisement featuring Peter Phillips96
Nestle, which arrived in Shanghai in 1907, built its first
factory in Shuangcheng in 1987, which opened in 1990.97 The Swiss
dairy giant has not only brought wholesale transformations to the
local economy wherever it went, but also made rapid gains in market
share. Advertisements for Nestle’s infant formula was common in
Chinese hospitals from the late 1990s into the first decade of this
century.98 By 1999, Nestle’s total revenue of 13.3 billion US dollars
was 74 times that of Shanghai Bright, one of the largest Chinese dairy

Geroge Bowden, Does a Milk Advert Show Harry and Meghan’s Future?, BBC
NEWS (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-51188894.
97 See NESTLÉ, NESTLÉ IN CHINA CREATING SHARED VALUE 4 (2012), available at
https://www.nestle.com/sites/default/files/assetlibrary/documents/library/document
s/corporate_social_responsibility/nestle_china_csv_report_2012_english%20versi
on.pdf.
98 Personal communication from Chun-mei Li to authors (March 2021). The
government now encourages breast feeding but the law is relatively permissive
with respect to advertising substitutes for breast milk. See Fang Jin, Marketing of
Infant Formula Must be Regulated, CHINA DAILY,
http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201905/09/WS5cd35d4fa3104842260ba9a5.html
(May 9, 2019).
96
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firms.99 Nestle is now the largest food and beverage company in the
Chinese market.100
While firms like Nestlé are at the forefront of Chinese dairy
development, their success would not have been possible without the
systematic backing of the Chinese state at all levels. The most
significant piece of China’s governmental push for dairy is the school
milk program. It began piloting in five of China’s most populated
cities in 1999, promoting the centralized sales and distribution of
ultra-pasteurized liquid milk to schoolchildren at the prescribed daily
consumption level of 200 ml.101 By 2020, the program covered a total
of 26 million schoolchildren in more than 63 thousand schools all
over the country, becoming a stable sales channel for 123 dairy firms
that are enrolled as program suppliers.102
In numerous public reports and policy documents, the
Chinese Dairy Association identifies rural China’s low consumption
of liquid cow milk as a sure sign of backwardness, hence targeted
marketing in rural areas. 103 In school milk promotional materials,
liquid cow milk is commonly depicted as a desirable way of life, an
essential ingredient for student health, and a symbol of the modern
economy. 104 The program is promoted through officially-endorsed
press conferences, required health courses, student quizzes, radio
programs, parent meetings, and even an annual School Milk Day.105

99

Huijun Zhang (张辉军), Xibu Nai Ye Mianlin de Tiaozhan He Zhanlue Xuanze
Challenges and Strategic Choices Faced by Western Dairy Industry (西部奶业面
临的挑战和战略选择) [Challenges and Strategic Choices Faced by Western
Dairy Industry], GANSU NONGYE (1 甘肃农业) [GANU AGRICULTURE], no. 1 2001
at 59, 59-63.
100 NESTLÉ, supra note 97, at 2.
101 See School Milk Programme Under Way, CHINA DAILY (Nov. 21, 2001),
http://www.china.org.cn/english/SO-e/22455.htm.
102 Guoija “Xuesheng Yinyong Nai Jihua” Shishi 20 Nian Ji Xiandai Nai Ye
Pingjia Tixi Jianshe Tuijin Hui Zai Beijing Longzhong Zhaokai (国家“学生饮用

奶计划”实施 20 年暨现代奶业评价体系建设推进会在北京隆重召开) [The
20th Year of the Implementation of the National “Student Milk Drinking Plan”
and the Promotion Meeting for the Construction of a Modern Dairy Evaluation
System Were Held in Beijing], ZHONGGUO NAI YE XIEHUI (中国奶业协会) [DAIRY
ASS’N OF CHINA (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.dac.org.cn/read/newgndt21011414300550910155.jhtm.
103 See School Milk Programme Under Way, supra note 101.
104 Michaela Böhme, ‘Milk from the Purest Place on Earth’: Examining Chinese
Investments in the Australian Dairy Sector, 38 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES, 327, 330
(2020).
105 See School Milk Programme Under Way, supra note 101.
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In its push for uniformity and safety, the program only
allows for packaged, ultra-pasteurized liquid cow milk with long
shelf lives. 106 The government’s promotion of this single product
type has raised many controversies, especially in western regions
where ethnic minority children are accustomed to drinking fresh
dairy milk from local – if not their own – cattle farms.107 Despite such
pushback, the school milk program’s nationwide endorsement has
successfully enabled ultra-pasteurized milk to grow from obscurity
to monopoly in China – commanding 77.3 percent of the market,
according to a randomized household survey in 2014.108 This figure
can be corroborated by dairy firm earnings data, where sales of ultrapasteurized milk contributed 64.2 billion RMB (approximately 10
billion USD) or 71 percent of the total revenue for Yili, the largest
dairy conglomerate in China. 109 In the span of only two decades,
China moved from localized, smallholder dairy operations to
concentrated, industrial production of dairy by a handful of
conglomerates.110 When the industrialized model so easily takes over
and becomes the norm of dairy-making, the entire dairy economy is
built around the self-fulling prophecy of scale, quantity, and
efficiency, leaving aside questions of animal welfare, sustainability,
and well-being.111
The stunning growth of China’s domestic dairy economy has
provided the impetus and capital for global expansion. In recent
years, as the Chinese economy grows beyond China, the dairy sector
is at the forefront of global China’s expansive reach. Under the rubric
of the “Dairy Belt and Road,” for example, Chinese state capital has
been aggressively mobilizing domestic demand in order for statebacked dairy conglomerates to establish a truly global supply chain
106

Id.
See Qiaoqiao Guan (关俏俏) & Jie Liu (刘杰), Xinjiang Xuesheng Nai Jihua
Tuixing Shu Nian Zaoyu Ganga (疆‘学生奶’计划推行数年遭遇尴尬) [School
Milk Programs Go Awry in Xinjiang] (新疆‘学生奶’计划推行数年遭遇尴尬),
107

XXINHUA DIAO (新华调) INHUA (July 19, 2011),
https://news.qq.com/a/20110719/000959.htm.
108 Zhai Shixian (翟世贤) et al., Shouru Zengzhang He Chengshi Hua Dui Yetai
Nai XiaofeinJiegou de Yingxiang (收入增长和城市化对液态奶消费结构的影响)
[The Impact of Income Growth and Urbanization on Liquid Milk Consumption
Structure], 8 ZHONGGUO NONGCUN JINGJI (中国农村经济) [CHINESE RURAL
ECON.] 45, 50 (2017).
109 See Dairy Global, The Dairy Market in China Will Be the World’s Largest by
2022, supra note 83.
110 See id.
111 CHRISTOPHER SCHLOTTMANN & JEFF SEBO, FOOD, ANIMALS, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: AN ETHICAL APPROACH (2018).
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from New Zealand to the Netherlands. 112 Today the largest dairy
farm in the world is the Mudanjiang City Mega Farm, located on the
China-Russia border, which mainly supplies the Russian market.113
It is an almost total confinement system in which its 100,000 dairy
cows almost never see grass or experience daylight. 114 Outside
China, in Chinese conglomerate Mengniu’s “flagship” plant in New
Zealand’s Pōkeno Village, which has a population of approximately
400, the idyllic landscape has been forever transformed. 115 The
plant’s Chinese manager boasted that “when we came here in 2013,
it was all pasture here. Within just six years, the population of
Pōkeno has doubled, and the employment and infrastructure
construction in town have also improved a lot".116
And yet, things are not so simple. According to China’s
official statistical yearbooks, since China’s opening in the 1980s,
meat and dairy production have increased enormously, still dairy
follows its own distinctive course.117 In the early 2000s, Chinese
dairy output grew at a pace that exceeded that of all other animal
protein sources. Yet, circa 2006, dairy output reached an inflection
point and has since remained stable.118

See Yifei Li & Judith Shapiro, Rethinking Extractivism on China’s Belt and
Road: Food, Tourism, and Talent, in OUR EXTRACTIVE AGE: EXPRESSIONS OF
VIOLENCE AND RESISTANCE 135, 138-42 (Judith Shapiro & John-Andrew McNeish
eds., 2021).
113 Amber Pariona, Biggest Farms in the World, WORLD ATLAS (Apr. 25, 2017),
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/biggest-farms-in-the-world.html.
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115 See Jamie Gray, Chinese Dairy Giant Mengniu Eyes Formula Expansion at
Pokeno, N.Z. HERALD (July 7, 2018),
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/chinese-dairy-giant-mengniu-eyes-formulaexpansion-at-pokeno/Q6NFFTDCDF4OBMZGW6RCH7HJ2Y/.
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XINHUA (Oct. 14, 2019), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201910/14/c_138470996.htm.
117 See The Dairy Market in China Will Be the World’s Largest by 2022, supra
note 87.
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Figure 9. China’s Meat and Dairy Output (1980-2018)119
Part of the explanation for this apparent anomaly is the dairy
scandals of the first decade of this century and the resulting growth
of dairy imports. The best known of these scandals came to light in
2008, and concerns the Sanlu Group, a state-owned Chinese dairy
products company that produced one of the oldest and most popular
brands of infant formula in China.120 The company adulterated milk
and infant formula with melamine in order to increase the nitrogen
content of diluted milk, thus giving it the appearance of higher
protein content, allowing it to pass quality control tests. 121 This

119

China Statistical Yearbook 2019, supra note 45.
See Echo Huang, Ten Years After China’s Infant Milk Tragedy, Parents Still
Won’t Trust Their Babies to Local Formula, QUARTZ (July 16, 2018),
https://qz.com/1323471/ten-years-after-chinas-melamine-laced-infant-milktragedy-deep-distrust-remains/.
121 See id.
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resulted in 300,000 illnesses, 54,000 hospitalizations, and 6
deaths.122
A consequence of these scandals was a massive increase in
dairy imports, as Chinese consumer confidence in domestic products
tanked.123

Figure 10. China’s dairy imports (1995-2013)124
New Zealand has been the major beneficiary of this market
shift, yet, ironically, a New Zealand company, Fonterra, owned 43%
of Sanlu at the time of the scandal.125 Fonterra’s CEO was criticized
both in the business press and by New Zealand’s prime minister for
his ethical failings, yet he went on to continue to have a distinguished
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See Xuli Wu et al., Challenges to Improve the Safety of Dairy Products in
China, 76 TRENDS FOOD SCI. & TECH. 6, 8 (2018).
123 See Yuting Wang et al., Dynamic Analysis of China’s Imported Raw Milk
Powder Consumption, 12 SUSTAINABILITY 1542, 1543-44 (2020).
124 Aussie FTA and Chinese Dairy Imports, DIM SUMS BLOG (Dec. 26, 2014),
http://dimsums.blogspot.com/2014/12/aussie-fta-and-chinese-dairy-imports.html
(analyzing China customs data).
125 See Edward Wong, Company at Core of China’s Milk Scandal Is Declared
Bankrupt, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/25/world/asia/25milk.html.
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career.126 Sanlu executives were not so fortunate: two were executed
and four others were imprisoned.127
Despite the long history of promoting dairy both by foreign
companies and the Chinese state, the overall result is surprising.
Dairy consumption has increased, but there has been nothing like the
spike that has occurred with respect to meat. Moreover, in relative
terms, China’s per capita dairy consumption remains a fraction of
that in industrialized economies. As the following figure shows,
Chinese per capita consumption in whole milk equivalent is about
1/10 of that of the United States.

Figure 11. Per capita consumption across selected countries in Milk
Equivalent (ME)

126

See Van der Heyden to Step Down as Fonterra Chair, Norris Tapped, N. Z.
HERALD (Nov. 16, 2011), https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/van-der-heyden-tostep-down-as-fonterra-chair-norristapped/IMO64UD6BDVNCG3IFVTQ634WDA/.
127 See Tania Branigan, China Executes Two for Tainted Milk Scandal, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 2009),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/24/china-executes-milk-scandalpair.
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NOTE: Per capita consumptions of each country are obtained
dividing total consumption (Source FAS-USDA) by the population
(Source FAO, Eurostat).128
This makes it all the more puzzling why the food pagodas
recommend such unrealistically high levels of dairy consumption,
especially since, as we have suggested, they largely follow
consumption rather than leading it. This becomes easier to
understand when we see that the food pagodas are just one element
of what we might call the “Chinese food/nutrition policy complex,”
which consists of overlapping layers of authority that represent the
internal checks and balances of the Chinese policymaking process.
The food pagodas overlap with several other guidance
documents and policy instruments, including most notably the
National Outline for Food and Nutritional Development (2014 to
2020) 129 , the National Nutritional Plan (2017 to 2030, with
qualitative goals only; not included in Figure 12)130, and the Healthy
China Action Plan (2019 to 2030, reiterating the goals in the national
outline), as well as countless provincial and local mandates and
directives on the same subjects.131 Unlike the food pagoda, which is
a public-facing document, these other elements in the policy128

Per Capita Consumption,
CLAL, https://www.clal.it/en/index.php?section=tabs_consumi_procapite (Sept.
11, 2021).
129 See generally Guowuyuan Bangong Ting (国务院办公厅) [Office of the State
Council], Zhong Guo Shi Wu Yu Yingyang Fazhan Gangyao (2014-2020 Nian) (中

国食物与营养发展纲要（2014—2020 年)) [China Food and Nutrition
Development Program (2014-2020)], ZHONGUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHONGYANG
RENMIN ZHENGFU (中華人民共和國中央人民政府) [THE CENT. PEOPLE’S GOV’T
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (Jan. 28, 2014),
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2014-02/10/content_2581766.htm.
130 See generally Guowuyuan Bangong Ting (国务院办公厅) [Office of the State
Council], Guomin Yingyang Jihua (2017-2030 Nian) (国民营养计划（2017—
2030 年) de Tongzhi [National Nutrition Plan (2017-2030)], ZHONGUA RENMIN
GONGHEGUO ZHONGYANG RENMIN ZHENGFU (中華人民共和國中央人民政府)
[THE CENT. PEOPLE’S GOV’T OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (July 13, 2017),
http://ww.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-07/13/content_5210134.htm.
131 See Jiankang Zhongguo Xingdong Tuijin Weiyuanhui (健康中国行动推进委
员会 ) [Health China Action Promotion Committee], Jiankang Zhongguo
Xingdong (2019-2030 Nian) (健康中国行动（2019—2030 年)) [Healthy China
Action (2019-2030)], ZHONGUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHONGYANG RENMIN
ZHENGFU (中華人民共和國中央人民政府) [THE CENT. PEOPLE’S GOV’T OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (July 15, 2019), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/201907/15/content_5409694.htm.

CHINA’S FOOD PAGODAS

2021]

159

complex serve as the media by which government agencies
communicate with each other internally.132
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Figure 12. Pagoda Recommendations, National Outlines, and Actual
Consumption Levels of Foods in China (grams/day)133
The national outline goals (Figure 12) are closer to actual
consumption levels than those of the pagoda. In the case of dairy, for
example, in contrast to the public-facing pagoda recommendation of
300 grams a day, the internal government target was only 98.6 grams
for the years 2014 to 2020.134 The pattern holds for other categories
as well.
Unlike public-facing goals in the pagoda, which are
intended to be educational and aspirational, internal goals in the
national outline are meant to be practical and actionable. 135 They
represent an internal consensus across multiple government agencies
from local to central levels. Moreover, unlike the food pagoda, the
outline targets are binding, in the sense that officials are evaluated
based on how their jurisdiction satisfies them.136

132

See Guowuyuan Bangong Ting (国务院办公厅) [Office of the State Council],

supra note 129; Guowuyuan Bangong Ting (国务院办公厅) [Office of the State
Council], supra note 130; Jiankang Zhongguo Xingdong Tuijin Weiyuanhui (健康
中国行动推进委员会) [Health China Action Promotion Committee], supra note
131.
133 China Statistical Yearbook 2019, supra note 45.
134 CHINESE NUTRITION SOCIETY, CHINESE DIETARY GUIDELINES 20 (2016).
135 Pierre F. Landry et al., Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political
Selection Along the Chinese Administrative Ladder, 51 COMPAR. POL. STUD. 1074,
1075 (2017), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414017730078.
136 See id.
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The discrepancy between these inward and outward-facing
documents is an indication of the complex policy process at work in
today’s China, in which policy advisors strategically put forward an
intentionally unrealistic “ask” in anticipation of an inevitable
compromise down the road. 137 From this perspective, the dairy
recommendations in the Food Pagoda can be seen as the nutritionists’
“ask” in a complex policy-making environment. While nutritionists
play an important role in advising policymakers, they do not
themselves make policies. As such, their advice is juxtaposed and
compared with advice from medical doctors, agriculturalists,
statisticians, economic development specialists, and even trade
advocates. This fragmented structure helps the Chinese state collect
a wide range of inputs, but also means that the resulting policy is the
product of compromises and trade-offs among different groups. In
this context, advancing an unrealistically big “ask” in the publicfacing food pagoda gives state nutritionists much-needed bargaining
power in the policy process. Moreover, Chinese top nutrition
scholars, like other policy actors, are influenced by their own values
and interests, and the changing landscape of research funding,
especially as dairy firms such as Danone and Nestlé fulfill their
corporate social responsibility goals through dedicated streams of
research spending. 138
The industrial advocacy group, Dairy
Association of China, is housed in an office just one floor under the
nation's top dairy research unit in the prestigious Chinese Academy
of Agricultural Science in building #3 of the complex on 2 Yuan
Ming Yuan West Road in Beijing.139
The apparent disconnect of the food pagoda is thus a
consequence of the layering of different interest groups and
bureaucratic actors in Chinese politics. In other words, what is often
dubbed the “policy implementation gap” is an inherent feature of the
137

See Xufeng Zhu, Strategy of Chinese Policy Entrepreneurs in the Third Sector:
Challenges of “Technical Infeasibility”, 41 POL’Y SCI. 315, 319 (2008),
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11077-008-9070-2.
138 Yang et al., supra note 34, at 909.
139 See Nai Chanpin Zhi Liang Yu Pinggu Keji Chuangxin Tuandui (奶产品质量

与风险评估科技创新团队) [Dairy Product Quality and Risk Assessment
Technology Innovation Team], ZHONGGUO KEXUEYUAN DONGWU KEXUE YANJIU
SUO (中国科学院动物科学研究所) [INSTITUTE OF ANIMAL SCIENCES OF CAAS],
http://wztest0821.caas.cn/rctd/kytd/217524.htm (last visited Oct. 16,
2021); Zhongguo Nai Ye Xiehui Jiben Gaikuang (中国奶业协会基本概况) [Basic
Overview of Dairy Association of China], ZHONGGUO NAI YE XIEHUI (中国奶业协
会) [DAIRY ASSOCIATION OF CHINA], https://www.dac.org.cn/normal/newxhjj.jhtm
(last visited Oct. 16, 2021).
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central government’s policy process, where the public-facing
pledges and commitments run parallel to the government’s internal
action plans and strategies.140 Outward-facing policies, such as the
Food Pagoda, sketch out an aspirational image of the nation, whereas
inward-facing documents define the day-to-day governance of
China. The food pagoda, and its unrealistically high dairy
recommendation is intended not as a set of rules for citizens to abide
by on a daily basis, but as an aspirational statement that paints the
picture of the ideal national diet in the eyes of China’s
modernization-driven policymakers. While the discrepancy in policy
targets reflects the internal complexity of China’s sprawling
governing apparatus, they are in many ways disconnected from the
social experience of food in China. This disconnect is most striking
in the fact that, when it comes to actual dairy consumption, the
Chinese people have thus far, largely ignored the efforts of both
international marketers and the domestic food/nutrition policy
complex.
VI. Climate, Health and Animal Welfare
Thus far, we have shown that the goals, roles, and
consequences of the Chinese dietary recommendations are more
complex than might have been imagined. As we noted in Section III,
what caught the world’s attention in the 2016 food pagoda was its
meat reduction recommendation and its potential impact on climate
change. However, when the pagoda’s recommendations are taken as
a whole, their impact on climate change is much less positive than
might have been thought.
The per capita emission reduction potential (0.386 kg
CO2e/day) of China’s proposed cut in meat consumption in 2016, for
example, is more than wiped out by the additional emission (0.465
kg CO2e/day) of the proposed dairy increase alone. As Figure 13
shows, the CO2 emissions of the food pagoda’s recommended diet
totals at 2.895 kg CO2e/day, reflecting a 31.3 percent increase from
the observed emissions level of 2.204 kg CO2e/day in 2012. Taken
together, the CO2 implication of the food pagoda is net-positive: it
increases emissions from the current dietary baseline. However, on
a more optimistic note, compliance with the 2016 pagoda would
decrease emissions relative to the 2007 pagoda.141
140

R. Ran, Perverse Incentive Structure and Policy Implementation Gap in
China’s Local Environmental Politics, 15 J. ENV’T POL’Y & PLAN. 17, 17 (2013),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1523908X.2012.752186.
141 The GHG implications for different food categories are interpolated on the
basis of prior research, which accounts for emissions associated with production,
consumption, and waste of the average U.S. diet (Heller and Keoleian 2015), and
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Figure 13. CO2 Emissions of China's Diet, Observed Trends (1982,
1992, 2002, 2012) and Pagoda Goals (1997, 2007, 2016) (kg
CO2e/day)142
As the actual Chinese diet has become lighter by weight
(Figure 4), its CO2 emissions have increased (Figure 13), due in large
part to the shift toward carbon-intensive foods such as meats, aquatic
foods, and eggs. Still, the actual consumption behavior of the
Chinese people is more climate-friendly than what is recommended
by the state.
adapted to the Chinese context in accordance with the Chinese Nutrition Society’s
(2021) recommendations. Martin C. Heller & Gregory A. Keoleian, Greenhouse
Gas Emission Estimates of U.S. Dietary Choices and Food Loss, 19 J. INDUS.
ECOLOGY 391, 391–401 (2014),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jiec.12174; Zhongguo Jumin Shanshi
Zhinan 2021 Ban (中国居民膳食指南 2021 版) [Chinese Residents’ Dietary
Guidelines 2021 Edition], ZHONGGUO YINGYANG XUEHUI (中国营养学会)
[CHINESE NUTRITION SOCIETY], http://dg.cnsoc.org/article/2021b.html (last visited
Oct. 21, 2021). The GHG coefficients and their derivative functions are recorded
in Appendix A.
142See “2006 Zhongguo Weisheng Tongji Nianjian” (《2006 中国卫生统计年鉴
》) [“2006 China Health Statistics Yearbook”], supra note 45; China Statistical
Yearbook 2019, supra note 45.
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While climate concerns do not figure into the construction of
the pagodas, health is an important consideration. Exactly what
conformity to the pagoda would mean in this regard is too
complicated for us to address here. However, in a society with a
growing obesity rate, 143 radically increasing dairy consumption
while decreasing the consumption of staples would appear to be
moving in the wrong direction. In addition to such direct health
effects, animal agriculture produces indirect health effects that are
often unnoticed. A paper currently under review shows that by
driving increases in PPM2.5 pollution, there were about 66,000
premature deaths in 2010 alone as a result of the intensification of
animal agriculture from 1990-2010.144
It is even more difficult to assess the full impact on animal
welfare of the dietary recommendations, especially since
consumption can drive production offshore as well as in country.
Since becoming Brazil’s largest trade partner in 2009, a position that
had been long held by the United States, China has become the
destination for increasing volumes of Brazilian shipments of soy and
beef products, thus driving Amazonian deforestation in Brazil. 145
Current estimates suggest that the size of China’s dairy herd will
continue to decrease over the next few years but, due to imports, the
impact on dairy cows globally may increase.146 Even if the pagoda’s
recommended decreases in beef consumption were achieved, in
terms of the total number of animals killed for food, it would be more
than offset by increases in the consumption of aquatic animals. What
is more likely to happen, in any case, is that the consumption of
aquatic animals will increase and be added to further increases in
meat consumption.147 Already, as of 2018 China slaughtered more
pigs, chickens, sheep, and fish than any other country, and was
poised to surpass the United States with respect to cows. 148 In
See Sintia Radu, China’s Obesity Rate Triples in 10 Years, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/201910-28/obesity-rates-in-china-have-tripled-over-the-past-10-years.
144 See Xueying Liu et al., Dietary Shifts Can Reduce Premature Deaths Related to
Particulate Matter Pollution in China, 2 NATURE FOOD 997 (2021),
https://doi.org/10.1038/s43016-021-00430-6.
145 Philip M. Fearnside, Amazonian Forest Loss and the Long Reach of China’s
Influence, 15 ENV’T, DEV. & SUSTAINABILITY 325, 325 (2012),
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10668-012-9412-2.
146 See Heller & Keoleian, supra note 141.
147 Richard York, Poultry and Fish and Aquatic Invertebrates Have Not Displaced
Other Meat Sources, 4 NATURE SUSTAINABILITY 766, 766-68 (2021),
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-021-00714-6.
148 Bas Sanders, Global Animal Slaughter Statistics & Charts: 2020 Update,
FAUNALYTICS (July 29, 2020), https://faunalytics.org/global-animal-slaughterstatistics-and-charts-2020-update/.
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addition to concerns about the number of animals killed, Chinese law
provides virtually no legal protection for animals used in
agriculture.149
VII. Concluding Remarks
In the opening chapter of his three-volume treatise entitled
General Plan for Nation Building, the founding president of the
Republic of China, Sun Yat-Sun, proudly proclaimed:
“All of China is culturally accustomed to
vegetarianism. … By contrast, Europeans
and Americans are in the fashion of
carnivorism and alcoholism, in spite of
scientific advocacy on the one hand and
regulatory prohibition on the other. . . .
Chinese cultural customs of eating and
drinking are assuredly superior to that of all
other nations.”150
Sun arrived at this sweeping conclusion of national
gastronomical superiority based on one single foodstuff—tofu.
“Tofu is a must for the Chinese vegetarian diet; it is the plant-based
equivalent of meat. It has all the benefits of meat, but none of its
toxins,” Sun asserted.151 To the “founding father” of modern China,
tofu was the anchor of national identity.
China has no responsibility to “save the world,” but a nation
that resists dairy, finds tofu as an anchor of its national identity, and
whose dietary regulations call for a level of meat consumption that
is 1/5th of that of North America and Australia, and about 1/4th of that
of Europe, can provide important lessons to the world; and for China,
this can be an important source of “soft power.” For this to occur,
the food pagoda would have to become more coherent with respect
to its impacts on climate, health, and animal welfare and also more
efficacious with respect to behavior, at least with its recommendation
to reduce meat consumption.
Recommendations are not selfenforcing and it is the job of a government that organizes and
administers a complex set of policies and negotiates competing
interests to make recommendations real in everyday life. There is a
widely held assumption—sometimes even hope—that China’s topdown political system can compel citizens and firms to adopt
149

See DEBORAH CAO, ANIMALS IN CHINA: LAW AND SOCIETY (2015); PETER J. LI,
ANIMAL WELFARE IN CHINA 10-11 (2021).
150 SUN YAT-SEN, GENERAL PLAN FOR NATION BUILDING (建國方略) (1917).
151 Id.
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sweeping changes in the interest of the common good simply by
ordering them to do so. This is at best an illusion and at worst a
delusion in most areas of life. 152 In any case the pagoda, in its
political and bureaucratic contexts, turns out to be a remarkably soft
instrument of public policy, adapting to, as much as challenging, the
society’s changing dietary patterns. The image of the Chinese
government as a proactive, draconian climate defender does not hold
up, at least not now, in the case of the food pagoda.
What our investigation shows is that the Chinese
food/nutrition policy complex tends to frame rural China as a space
that lags behind and needs to catch up with urban modernity.153 But
perhaps it is not rural China that has lagged behind, but rather urbanoriented food policies that are leading towards a dystopian future.
With their dependence on plant-based food sources, preference for
local supplies, attention to seasonality and active involvement in
agricultural production, the rural people of China have wisdom,
experience, and culture to offer. We are keenly aware of the danger
in romanticizing rural ways of life, especially as growing numbers of
Chinese urbanites flock to rural areas to get a taste of romantic
rurality. 154 Much of this romanticizing reflects a jarring lack of
evidence-based understanding of China’s vast rural areas.
However, future research would do well to examine more closely
food, nutrition, sustainability and health in rural contexts.
Just as rural areas have much to offer to a rapidly urbanizing
China, the country’s own past also holds a rich repertoire of wisdom
for living through the Anthropocene. In a rare display of internal
dissent, Xianglin Xu, a seasoned economist at the Central Party
School, wrote in criticism of the 1996 food pagoda that:
“the nutritionists’ proposal is incompatible with
our national conditions. . . . Advocating for fully
Westernizing our diet, [the food pagoda] tries to
turn from plant-based food sources to animal ones,
just like post-war Japan did. The result in Japan is
that 60 percent of their caloric intake has become
152

See, e.g., Mark Beeson, Coming to Terms with the Authoritarian Alternative:
The Implications and Motivations of China’s Environmental Policies, 5 ASIA &
PAC. POL’Y STUD. 34, 38 (2017),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/app5.217.
153 See Afton Clarke-Sather, ‘But We Are the Most Backward’: Hierarchical
Categorization of Modernity in Contemporary Chinese National Identity, 83 POL.
GEOGRAPHY 1,8 (2020),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0962629820303231.
154 See Choong-Hwan Park, Nongjiale Tourism and Contested Space in Rural
China, 40 MODERN CHINA 519, 543 (2014).
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import-dependent by the 1990s. … It seems
impossible for China to afford the same.”155
Xu’s dissent has gone unnoticed in the last two decades and
a half. China’s policymakers are yet to fully appreciate the real costs
of abandoning plant-based food traditions in favor of animal-based
culinary modernity.
Still, there are hopeful signs from many different directions.
The China Vegan Society launched in May 2021 in Yunnan. 156
Buying discounted foods close to their “sell by” dates is becoming
common among young people.157 The COVID pandemic gave many
in China renewed impetus for moving toward a plant-based diet.158
Nestle plans to build a plant-based meat factory in Tianjin.159 As in
the rest of the world, capital is beginning to move towards plantbased protein.
In the final analysis, the problem is not that the Chinese state
has been slow to foster a healthy and sustainable diet for the nation
of 1.4 billion, but rather that the state has sometimes acted too much
and often incoherently.160 On the receiving end of mixed, frequently
changing signals, the people have not been presented with clear
messaging about food that actually engages with the realities of
everyday life. If the state can dial back its promotion of the modern,
urban diet, and foster the rediscovery of the many centuries of
culinary richness—let food be what it has always been in the Middle
Kingdom: culture, tradition, and identity—then Sun Yat-Sun’s hope
of becoming “assuredly superior to that of all other nations”161 might
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just be within reach and, as a consequence, China may yet help to
save the world.

